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STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES 
U. C. A. 76-8-510 provides: 
A person commits a felony of the second degree if, 
believing that an official proceeding or investigation is 
pending or about to be instituted, he: 
1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes anything with a 
purpose to impair it verity or availability in the 
proceeding or investigation. . . . 
U.C.A. 76-8-501(1) defines official proceeding as: 
. . .any proceeding before a legislative, judicial, administrative, 
or other governmental body or official authorized by law to 
take evidence under oath or affirmation, including a notary or 
other person taking evidence in connection with any of those 
proceedings. 
TABLE OF CASES 
State v. Brooks. 563 P.2d 799 (Utah 1977) 18 
State v. Eaton. 701 P.2d 496 (Utah 1985) 22 
State v. Harmon. 767 PI.2d 567 (Utah App. 1989) 19 
State v. Hill. 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986) 16 
State v. McCardell. 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982) 19, 20 
State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) 18,20 
State v. Romero.554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976)....16,19,20 
State v. Wagstaff. 846 P.2dl311 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)..22 
State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993) 19 
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Section 
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah State 
Constitution Article 1, Section 12; Utah Code Annotated Section 77-1 
6(g); and Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code Annotated, and the Rule of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is a appeal from an order of sentencing. The essence of 
the appeal is that the evidence is insubstantial and the 
conviction should be set aside. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The Defendant, Joseph Gonzales ("Gonzales") was convicted of 
the offense of 'Tampering with Evidence' pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-510 (1975). He was co-defendant with two others. The 
information accused Roger Hicks of Unlawful Discharge of a Firearm 
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in Count I. Gonzales, Hicks and Norton in Count 2 with 'Tampering 
with Evidence'. A fourth defendant (Tug Todd) was also accused in 
the initial documents; however, said defendant, in exchange for a 
compromise of his charges, testified for the State. 
The date of the accused acts was August 17, 1997. The 
'evidence tampering' charge accused Gonzales of altering or 
concealing anything with a purpose to impair its availability in the 
proceeding or investigation, believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending. Mr. Hicks was accused of firing from the car 
five shots at two people. 
Initially, in the opening statement, the State limited their 
argument to Mr. Gonzales assisting in the concealment a firearm in a 
glove box. The State, in their closing argument, modified their 
position and argued that he hid a small package of marijuana (89 
grams) in the backseat of a car driven and owned by Hicks. 
The defendant seeks to review the evidence placed in a light 
most favorable to the prosecution. This evidence reveals that a 
shooting did occur within the City of Orem, Utah on the subject date. 
Leila Peacock testified that five (5) shots were fired in her direction 
from a car being driven by Roger Hicks. Gonzales was an occupant in 
the car when the shooting took place. Gonzales was riding in the left 
4 
rear portion of the suspect vehicle with three other men. Mr. Todd 
(State's witness) was seated next to Gonzales in the right rear portion 
of the vehicle. Brad Norton was seated in the front passenger side. 
Roger Hicks was driving. (This positioning of the passengers and 
drivers is generated from the testimony of all police officers. It 
contradicts Todd's testimony. Todd asserted that he was seated 
behind the driver and Gonzales was in the back right passenger 
seat.) 
Peacock identified a large dark male as the shooter. This 
matches the description of the driver, Roger Hicks. It excludes 
Gonzales, Norton, and Todd. (No one suggest that Gonzales fired the 
weapon.) All evidence suggest that the shooting was done by Hicks. 
(Hicks was later, in a subsequent trial, convicted of Count I; Norton's 
case was dismissed on Count 2; Tug Todd provided evidence for the 
State and all charges were compromised.) 
The suspect vehicle was later stopped by Officer Simmons of 
the Orem Police Department and thereafter backed by eleven 
additional police officers. All four occupants of the vehicle were 
detained and arrested. During the course of the post-arrest search of 
the car, a magazine/gun clip to a nine-(9) millimeter handgun was 
found in or around the front "glove box" area of the vehicle. 
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Evidence at trial, from the police officers involved, showed only 
the front passengers of the vehicle would have any reasonable 
likelihood of hiding or secreting a gun or clip in the "glove box" area. 
This evidence would exclude the defendant Gonzales from the charge 
of "tampering with evidence' via the clip (glove box) and lead to the 
only logical conclusion that either Hicks or Norton concealed the 
firearm and/or clip. The evidence from the prosecution's witnesses 
(Tug Todd) identified the driver as doing such acts. This obviously 
excluded Gonzales. No evidence exists which would lead any 
reasonable person to believe Gonzales had anything to do with the 
concealment of the clip/gun. See Testimony of Officer Hendricks on-— 
more fully developed below. 
State's witness Todd testified at trial, as a witness for the 
prosecution, that he watched Mr. Hicks place the gun in the glove 
box. Todd further testified that Gonzales had no participation in the 
hiding of the weapon. Upon further search of the vehicle at the 
scene of the stop, officers located eighty-nine (89) grams of 
marijuana in a crease between the bench seat and back support of 
the car. In additional testimony, Todd noted that as an occupant of 
the vehicle, he was the closest to the marijuana and that Gonzales 
had absolutely no participation in hiding nor secreting the 
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discovered marijuana. In fact, Todd knew nothing of the marijuana 
being hidden in the back seat. He saw Gonzales do nothing to hide 
the marijuana. The reasonable inference is that the marijuana was at 
that location prior to the shooting. The evidence suggests only the 
finding of the marijuana in the crease. (This conclusion is drawn by 
the testimony of the lead officer Hendrickson. However, for accuracy 
sake, it must be noted that Officer Young found the seat to be moved 
and the marijuana found beneath the seat.. Yet, this testimony is 
contradicted by Officer Liddiard.) No direct evidence is given as to 
when the marijuana was placed in the crease of the seat. 
Without any direct evidence, the jury was then required to 
speculate as to when the marijuana was placed under the seat and; if 
so, at what time.. The testimony, via Tug Todd, was that the 
defendant had no participation in hiding neither the gun nor the 
marijuana. After the arrest, the officers reported that the defendant 
acknowledged that the marijuana was his. It is also at this time that 
the defendant exihibited certain behavior which could be believed to 
be cockiness and disrepect for the police officers involved. No 
inculpatory evidence existed as to when it was placed in the seat. 
Was it in an effort to hide or secret the marijuana in response to the 
officer's stop or had it been placed there before the time of the 
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shooting; the night before; hours before or after. Speculation and 
conjective is simply offered. The State's closing argument suggest 
and encourages such speculation. 
It must be weighed against the direct evidence that the 
defendant did nothing. The evidence that the defendant did nothing 
comes from the State's own witness, Tug Todd. The defendant's 
position is that the marijuana was located under the right rear 
portion of the back seat. This is the location of Mr. Todd. Todd is also 
the last one to leave the car after stop. He is the one nearest where 
the marijuana was to be found. He is the State's most important 
witness and the only one having direct knowledge of the conduct of 
the other defendants. Excepting the direct evidence of Mr. Todd, the 
conduct of the car's occupants is left for speculation and conjecture. 
Witness Todd tells of Mr. Hicks shooting, and hiding the gun. He 
tells that Mr. Gonzales had nothing to do with the gun. He tells that 
Mr. Gonzales had nothing to do with the marijuana. Mr. Gonzales was 
not the person shooting the firearm. Mr. Todd testified that upon the 
stop by the police, Mr. Hicks got out of the vehicle, followed by Mr. 
Norton, then Mr. Gonzales, and then Mr. Todd. He knew nothing 
about marijuana being in the car and had no recollection of any 
marijuana being present in the car. There was no discussion about 
8 
marijuana being in the car. He tells that Mr. Gonzales had nothing to 
do with either hiding the gun, or hiding marijuana. 
Todd reports that Mr. Hicks threw the gun in the glove 
compartment. The marijuana was a complete surprise to Mr. Todd. 
According to Mr. Todd it would have been impossible for Mr. 
Gonzales to reach up and hide the gun in the jockey box. Lead 
Detective Hendrickson also confirms this. 
Todd tells that if Mr. Gonzales hid the marijuana in the back 
seat, Mr. Todd would noticed since he was the last to leave the car. 
Mr. Todd did not have any memory of standing up or coordinating in 
any way to hide the marijuana under the full bench seat. The fair 
conclusion is that the marijuana must have been stored there far in 
advance of the shooting and police stop. 
The evidence introduced to support the State's position did 
nothing to bolster their case against Mr. Gonzales. In fact, this is one 
of the unusual cases where the State's witness actually supports the 
defendant's innocence. 
FACTS WITH REFENCE TO TRANSCRIPT 
The prosecution called the following witnesses: 
1. Lea Peacock; 5. Kelly Liddiard: 
2. Tug Todd; 6. William Young; 
3. Randall Clement; 7. Kris Hendrickson 
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4. Darcy Simmons; 8. Denton Johnson. 
Ms. Peacock identified a large male with a ponytail as being 
one of the persons seen behind the Outback restaurant. See T9, L9. 
She tells of 4 to 6 shots being fired in their direction. T13, LI8. She 
tells us that the shots came from the driver's side of the vehicle. T16, 
LI5. Shots did not come from the back seat. T16, L21. The driver was 
the shooter. T16, L23. She went on to describe a large man, more 
particularly a bigger, dark male, dark skinned. T17, L21. She did not 
recognize Mr. Gonzales as being an occupant of the motor vehicle J18, 
1-2.) and Mr. Gonzales was definitely not the person shooting the 
firearm. T18, L 11 
The second witness called by the State of Utah was Tug Todd. 
Mr. Todd had been granted immunity by the State from prosecution. 
In exchange for his testimony, Mr. Todd told the Court that Mr. 
Gonzales, Mr. Hicks and Mr. Norton were with him in the vehicle. Mr. 
Todd placed himself in the back seat behind the driver. T21, L3. Mr. 
Todd was not aware of any marijuana being present in the vehicle. 
He did not have any with him. T21, LI2. He tells us that he woke up 
to gunfire and saw Mr. Hicks pulling his arm back into the window, 
driver's side. T22, LI5. He witnessed Hicks place the gun on his lap 
and turned around and starting heading for the freeway. T22, LI8. 
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He tells that Mr. Hicks got out of the vehicle pursuant to the police 
stop first. T24, L7. Followed by Mr. Norton, T24, L9: then Mr. 
Gonzales, T24. L 11 and then Mr. Todd followed T24. L 13. Mr. Todd 
told Officer Hendrickson of the Orem Police Department that he had 
witnessed Mr. Hick's fire the gun and then Mr. Hicks stashed the gun 
in the glove box. T25, L4. Mr. Todd knew nothing about marijuana 
being in the car. T2 5, L8. Mr. Todd had no recollection of any 
marijuana being present in the car. T26, L 19. There was no 
discussion about marijuana being in the car. T26, L22. Mr. Gonzales 
had nothing to do with either hiding the gun, or hiding marijuana. 
T2 8, L I 8 . Mr. Hicks threw the gun in the glove compartment and 
the marijuana was a complete surprise to Mr. Todd. T2 8, L I 8 - 2 3 . 
According to Mr. Todd it would have been impossible for Mr. 
Gonzales to reach up and hide the gun in the jockey box. T31, LI3 . 
i f the marijuana was hiding in the back seat by Mr. Gonzales, Mr. 
Todd would have had to stand up to allow such to occur. T31, L21 . 
Mr. Todd did not have any memory of stand up or coordinating in 
any way to hide the marijuana under the f u l l bench seat. If the 
marijuana was actually hidden under the bench seat it would have 
been necessary for Mr. Todd to stand up to allow such an event to 
occur. T3 1 , L22 T32 L3 . 
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According to Mr. Todd, Mr. Gonzales did not anything with his 
hands or any other device to hide marijuana. T32, L10-19. Mr. 
Gonzales did not even make a comment regarding marijuana. T3 1 , 
L24-T33 L2. 
Mr. Simmons tells that Mr. Hicks was driving and he recalled 
Mr. Gonzales being in the back seat. T52, L12-24. Officer Simmons 
placed Mr. Hicks in the driver position 150, L7. Norton was in the 
right front passenger seat. T5 6, L9. Mr. Todd was in the right rear 
passenger side. T56 L 16. Mi Gonzales was in fbe left rear 
quadrant. T5 6, LI8 . 
Officer Liddiaril tells us that it was a bench seat in the back. 
T 73, L2 3 . He tells of finding the bench seat loosened upon his 
approach to the vehicle. T74, L4. He kIK th,ti (he seat back was out 
away from the rear dash, whnc it should be up tight. He tells that he 
could pul Ins hand back there and pull it forward without any effort 
at all. He tells that he could pick up the lower poiiion ot the seat and 
pick it up without any effort. T7 4, L4-10. He lifted up the seat and 
he found smaller bags that appeared to be marijuana. T7 4, L 13. He 
found the marijuana right underneath what would in (he drivers 
passenger's side of the rear seat. T7 6, L 11. One must also 
remember that Tug luihl said he was sitting in this position and he 
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was the last person who left the vehicle. Further, Tug Todd 
remembers nothing of people hiding marijuana under the seat. T7 8, 
L23. 
Officer Young was next called by the State. Mr. Young tells 
that Mr. Gonzales was positioned behind the driver in the back seat 
and that Mr. Todd was behind the passenger portion. T83, 1 - 1 4 - 2 0 . 
Officer Young tells of patting down Mr. Gonzales in a frisking manner. 
He tells that nothing was found upon Mr. Gonzales. T84, L 1 3 . 
Officer young tells that he found the rear seat to be ajar, that he 
could pop it lose. It was not in a snug place as it should be, it had 
been released. T87, L9-12. However Officer Young tells that the 
portion of the back seat which supports the back was secure. (This 
would contradict Officer Liddiard's testimony) The lower portion 
upon which a person would sit upon was the only cushion ajar. T87, 
L 18. Officer Young tells of lifting up the bench seat and looking 
under it for weapons, but finding a bag containing a substance he 
knew as marijuana. T87, L20. Officer Young tells that the marijuana 
was found underneath the bench seat on the right side. T88, L8. This 
is the position of which Officer Simmons states Tug Todd was located. 
Mr. Young finds Mr. Gonzales in the left rear portion of the vehicle, 
behind the driver. T92, L25. Officer Young tells that there was no 
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way to tell when the marijuana was placed in that location, that in 
fact it may have been there for days, T95, L4. As Officer Young 
pulled up and had the spotlights upon the vehicle, he saw no h.uul 
gestures to put anything underneath the seat. T99, L W - I > . He saw 
no movement of anybody trying to puii up the back seat or 
whatever. T99, L22. 
Officer Hendrickson was then called by tin State. The State 
introduced an exhibit, which was the magazine found within the 
firearm. T107,LI2. This constituted Exhibit 17. Exhibit 12 was the 
magazine retrieved by Sergeant Young from Mr. Gonzales's pocket. 
T108, L8. 
Officer Hendrick aiso testified that there was no information 
that he received prior to the trial testimony that the seat was ajar in 
the back. ~ ' * T r Officer Hendricksor ooserving Officer 
Young retrieve the marijuana from the back seat area. Officer Young 
retrieved it from the non-drivers side, passenger side of the rear. 
T i l l , L17-21. Officer Hendrickson agreed with Darci Simmons 
placement of the occupants in the various positions within the 
vehicle. T 113, L4. Officer Hendrickson tells that the marijuana was 
simply tucked between the bench and the backrest of the seat. I 
114, L22. He tells that the marijuaila was not hidden underneath the 
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seat at all. T 114 L24. The marijuana was simply tucked between the 
seats. T 115, L6. The officers tell that the magazine would hold 13 
rounds. T 115, L 17. Eight rounds were located therein. T 115, L20. 
Five were thereby missing, TI 15, L22. This would correlate to the 
number of shots Ms. Peacock reports being fired. T 115, L25. 
Mr. Todd was called by the defense. Mr. Todd testified that to 
his recollection that the back seat was not ajar. T 169, L 1. Further 
Mr. Gonzales did nothing to hide marijuana. T169, L7. Mr. Todd did 
not notice any movement of the seat in any form or manner . T171, 
L6. He did not feel or see Mr. Gonzales or anyone stash or put the 
marijuana under the seat, or in the crease.T.171, L9. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT ONE—THE EVIDENCE IS NOT PRESENT TO JUSTIFY THE 
CONVICTION. 
The defendant argues that no basis exist in law for the conviction 
herein. The defendant was accused a violation of U.C.A. 76-8-510. 
The statute provides: 
A person commits a felony of the second degree if, 
believing that an official proceeding or investigation is 
pending or about to be instituted, he: 1) Alters, destroys, 
conceals, or removes anything with a purpose to impair it 
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verity or availability in the proceeding 01 investigation. 
An official proceeding is defined as : 
. . . any proceeding before a legislative, judicial, 
administrative, or other governmental body of official 
authorized by law to take evidence under oath or 
affirmation, including a notary or other person taking 
evidence in connection with any of these proceedings. 
U.C.A. 76-8-501(1) (Emphasis Added) 
No witness testified that the defendant jtfrred, destroyed, 
concealed or removes anvlhmg; nol die gun, the clip, nor the 
marijuana. No evidence suggested that there was a purpose to 
impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation. 
In fact, the State's ov rtness verify that the defendant did 
nothing to hide, alter, remove or conceal the gun and the clip 
POINT TWO—THE MOITON TO ARREST JUDGMEN
 10ULD 
HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
The trial court may arrest a jury verdict when the 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is 
so inconclusive or so inherently improbable a^  to an element of 
the crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt as to that element (Emphasis Added). 
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Defendant argues that the evidence is not supportive of the 
verdict of guilt. No evidence is present to justify the conviction. In 
fact, the evidence actually exonerates the defendant by evidencing 
that he had action to justify a conclusion that he alter, removed or 
conceal any evidence whether that be marijuana, a gun clip, or the 
gun. 
Point Three— THE OFFICER'S STOP OF THE CAR AND ITS 
OCCUPANTS WAS NOT AN OFFICIAL PROCEEDING OR 
INVESTIGATION. 
This is not an official proceeding or investigation. We have police 
stopping the car with four occupants. No official proceeding or 
investigation has commenced. It is not a legislative, judicial, 
administrative, or governmental body nor an official authorized by 
law to take evidence under oath or affirmation 
Defendant argues that the statute should be read to more 
strictly apply the definitions of "official proceeding or investigation" 
to comport with the definition set out in U.C.A. 76-8-501(1). Is it a 
'proceeding before a legislative, judicial, administrative, or other 
governmental body or official authorized by law to take evidence 
under oath or affirmation, including a notary or other person taking 
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evidence in connection with any of those proceedings'. If reasonable 
definitions are not imposed, the buckling of the seat belt, the 
finishing of the last few drops of an alcoholic beverage create a 
felony act of tampering with evidence. 
DETAILED ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE—THE EVIDENCE IS NOT PRESENT TO JUSTIFY THE 
CONVICTION. 
The defendant argues that no basis exisl in law for the conviction 
herein. The defendant was accused a violation of U.C.A. 76-8-510. 
The statute provides: 
A person commits a felony of the second degree if, 
believing that an official proceeding or investigation is 
pending or about to be instituted, he: 1) Alters, destroys, 
conceals, or removes anything with a purpose to impair it 
verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation. . . 
An official proceeding is defined as : 
. . . any proceeding before a legislative, judicial, 
administrative, or other governmental body of official 
authorized by law to take evidence under oath or 
affirmation, including a notary or other person taking 
evidence in connection with any of these proceedings. 
U.C.A. 76-8-501(1) (Emphasis Added) 
A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on 
inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of 
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guilty. State v. Hill. 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Romero.554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976). It must be based on at least 
some measurable credible evidence to support the conviction. 
No witness testified that the defendant altered, destroyed, 
concealed or removes anything; not the gun, the clip, nor the 
marijuana. No evidence suggested that there was a purpose to 
impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation. 
In fact, the State's own witness verify that the defendant did 
nothing to hide, alter, remove or conceal the gun and the clip 
involved in the shooting. See Testimony of Tug Todd. The same 
witness testified that the defendant did nothing to conceal, hide or 
secret the marijuana located in the back seat. 
It is only based on mere speculation as to the defendant's 
participation in hiding, or concealing any marijuana or the gun. 
Witnesses did not observed the defendant hide or conceal the gun 
nor the marijuana and the testimony from the State's witness (Tug 
Todd) cleared the defendant of such wrongdoing. 
This jury conviction is based on the supposition that the 
defendant must have known or must have contributed to such 
concealment; but a conviction should not be based on neither 
speculation nor conjecture. 
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The dangers here are significant. Here is a young man who 
does not fit the community's demographics. He is Hispanic. His co-
defendant is African-American (Mr. Hicks). Norton and Todd are 
Caucasian. From the jury perspective, hi (Mi Gonzales) and Mr. 
Hicks may present the picture of the a stereotypical gangster. Mr 
Gonzales, according to the testimony of the officers, was not 
respectful of the officers and was verbally confrontive. 
Societal or community bias and prejudice may sneak inu a 
jury's verdict, cut; but certain minimal legal precautions to 
protect against such evils. One tenet of the law i<; >le 
evidence must be present, even of a in in in ml nature, to negate 
racism or other negative emotions generated by the community 
majority. 
In State v. Brooks, 563 * .v: - i i9 / / ) is one example of 
an improper bias. s urncu a conviction. The Court held 
that the evidence was so inconclusive and unsatisfactory, as to the 
identification of the defendant (African-American), there that 
reasonable minds would have to emen am a reasonable doubt. The 
defendant's race became an issue there. The evidence therein was so 
intolerable that the Court mandated an acquittal. 
20 
The victim, a store clerk, there identified the robber as a 
black male, mid-to-late twenties, five feet nine inches in height, 
short Afro hair style, and clean shaven. The day later in a photo line-
up, the witness identified the defendant there as the robber. At trial 
the witness testified that the robber was six feet one inch tall. Two 
days after the robbery, he reported the robber to be five feet six 
inches in height. At the preliminary hearing, there was suggestion 
that the robber was six feet; the same height as the witness. 
Within days of the robbery, the peace officer located the 
defendant there and took pictures of him. It is noted that the 
defendant was 6 foot in height, with mustache, a goatee, and 
prominent bushy sideburns extending down to his jaw. It seems 
obvious that some bias existed in the Brooks jury. 
The evidence here is also egregious. No direct evidence exists 
then the evidence supporting the conviction. The evidence must 
preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; it did not. The 
State's evidence actually clears the defendant from guilt. 
The Court should correct this miscarriage of justice as in State 
v. Brooks, and grant the defendant's appeal — no reasonable juror 
could validity conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense 
of tampering with evidence as cited by the statute. 
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POINT TWO--THE MOIT( )N T() ARRIiST JUDGMENT SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN GRANTKh 
The trial court may arrest a jury verdict when the evidence, 
viewed in the light most favorable i ict, is so inconclusive 
or so inherently impr *.•-, as to an element of the crime that 
reasonable minds IIIUM nave entertained a reasonable doubt as to 
that element. State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983); State v. 
McCardelL 652 P.2d 942 (IJtali 1982): State v. Romero, 554 P.21) 216 
(Utah lc>76); State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Harmon, 767 P1.2d 567 (Utah App. 1989). 
In Workman, a defendant had fnvn convicted of 'sexual 
exploitation1 of his I in-'liln mi 'obstruction of justice.' The trial 
court granted the motion to arrest judgment. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed. Certiorari was granted. 
The Supreme Court, Justice Stewart, held that the evidence that 
defendant appeared in photograph depicting seven-year old 
daughter with her buttocks exposed was insufficient to support 
conviction for 'sexual exploitation' nor was the evidence sufficient to 
support the conviction for obstruction of justice. 
The 'sexual exploitation' charge evolved around a photograph 
exposing the child's buttocks. The State insisted that the defendant 
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knew of the picture and it exposing the child's buttocks. A person 
known as Kelly took the photograph and testified at the preliminary 
hearing that the defendant reacted angrily at the picture being 
taken. (Analogous to the testimony of Tug Todd who testified that 
the defendant did not hide the marijuana nor the gun). At trial, Kelly 
said he did not recall the defendant's reaction. The defendant 
testified that they did not know that the picture was taken until 
later when the police showed it to them. The trial judge arrested 
judgment because the evidence was lacking as to the defendant's 
requisite mental state. 
The State appealed arguing that the trial court did not apply 
the proper standard in 'arresting judgment.' The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court's ruling upholding the arrest of judgment. 
Upholding the standards as set out in State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443 
(Utah 1983); State v. McCardelL 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982): State v. 
Romero. 554 P.213 216 (Utah 1976), the Supreme Court found that 
the trial court may arrest a jury verdict when the evidence, viewed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so 
inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element. 
The Court further pronounced that a jury serves as the exclusive 
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judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given 
particular evidence and that a reviewing Court ordinarily will not 
reassess credibility or re-weigh the evidence. 
The Supreme Court, however, held that in unusual 
circumstances, a reviewing court may reassess witness credibility. 
The reviewing court may evaluate whether the evidence is so 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that it could not support a 
finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court then 
held: 
When, as here, the evidence consists solely of undisputed, 
circumstantial evidence, the role of the reviewing court is 
to determined (l)f whether there is any evidence that 
supports each and every element of the crime charged, 
and (2) whether the inferences that can be drawn from 
that evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human 
experience sufficient to prove each legal element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A guilty verdict is not 
legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give 
rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt . 
(Emphasis Added). 
Defendant argues that the evidence is not supportive of the 
verdict of guilt. No evidence is present to justify the conviction. In 
fact, the evidence actually exonerates the defendant by evidencing 
that he had action to justify a conclusion that he alter, removed or 
conceal any evidence whether that be marijuana, a gun clip, or the 
gun. 
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Point Three— THE OFFICER'S STOP OF THE CAR AND ITS 
OCCUPANTS WAS NOT AN OFFICIAL PROCEEDING OR 
INVESTIGATION. 
A person commits a felony of the second degree if, 
believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he: 
1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes anything with a 
purpose to impair it verity or availability in the 
proceeding or investigation. . . . 
An official proceeding is defined as : 
. . . any proceeding before a legislative, judicial, administrative, 
or other governmental body or official authorized by law to 
take evidence under oath or affirmation, including a notary or 
other person taking evidence in connection with any of those 
proceedings. (U.C.A. 76-8-501(1). 
This is not an official proceeding or investigation. We have police 
stopping the car with four occupants. No official proceeding or 
investigation has commenced. It is not a legislative, judicial, 
administrative, or governmental body nor an official authorized by 
law to take evidence under oath or affirmation. We simply have a 
number of police officers on the freeway making a stop of a car and 
its occupants. 
The Utah Courts have held that swallowing a bag that the 
police had taken into custody impaired the availability of that 
evidence and warranted conviction under U.C.A. 76-8-510. State v. 
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Wagstaff. 846 P.2d 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The manipulation of a 
Breathalyzer machine in order to obtain a false reading was also 
sufficient. State v. Eaton, 701 P.2d 496 (Utah 1985). It appears that 
the Court's previous holdings run contrary to the defendant's 
arguments here. 
The defendant argues that reasonable limits must be made. 
Defendant also notes that current case law does not conform to 
defendant's argument. However, does a person who is being stopped 
by police for a traffic violation and quickly swallows the last few 
drops remaining in his beer violate this statute? Does the motorist 
who being stop for a traffic violation and quickly buckles up his seat 
belt violate this section? 
Defendant argues that the statute should be read to more strictly 
apply the definitions of "official proceeding or investigation" to 
comport with the definition set out in U.C.A. 76-8-501(1). Is it a 
'proceeding before a legislative, judicial, administrative, or other 
governmental body or official authorized by law to take evidence 
under oath or affirmation, including a notary or other person taking 
evidence in connection with any of those proceedings'. If reasonable 
definitions are not imposed, the buckling of the seat belt, the 
finishing of the last few drops of the beverage create a felony act. 
26 
CONCLUSIONS 
This case does not warrant conviction. The evidence is not only 
lacking but supports the defendant's acquittal. There is no doubt 
that marijuana was located inside the car. The evidence never 
addressed the time when it was placed there nor did the State 
attempt to do so. The State's own witness suggest that it must have 
been there before the stop (Todd). One officer notes that the 
marijuana may have been there for days (Young). 
Suggesting that defendant Gonzales hid the gun is illogical. The 
best the State has to offer is that he hid the marijuana when Officer 
Simmons initiate his overhead lights The evidence suggest 
otherwise. There is no logical basis in the evidence to suggest such 
facts and thereby we ask jurors to speculate. 
At times when we ask jurors to speculate, sometimes ugliness 
steps to the front. 
DATED this day of July, 1999. 
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